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The proportion congruent effect is the
observation that congruency effects are
smaller when the proportion of incon-
gruent stimuli is higher. The conflict
adaptation account argues that this effect
is due to a shift of attention away
from the source of conflict. In contrast,
the contingency account proposes that
participants learn to predict the likely
response on the basis of the distracter,
and this produces a proportion congru-
ent effect incidentally. However, some
have argued that conflict adaptation can
be observed in the restricted scenarios
in which the mostly incongruent stimuli
are not strongly predictive of the correct
response. This opinion article argues that
comparing predictive to non-predictive
stimuli might be problematic. Some learn-
ing research would suggest that attention
to the distracter should vary, but for an
entirely different reason than that pro-
posed by conflict adaptation theory: con-
tingent stimuli attract attention.
In the Stroop paradigm (Stroop, 1935),
participants are tasked with the goal to
ignore a distracting color word and to
respond to the print color it is pre-
sented in. Only partially successful at
doing so, participants respond slower
and less accurately to incongruent stim-
uli (e.g., the word “blue” printed in red)
than to congruent stimuli (e.g., “blue”
in blue). Similar congruency effects are
observed in the Simon (Simon and Rudell,
1967), flanker (Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974),
picture-word (Rosinski et al., 1975), and
various other comparable tasks. Such con-
gruency effects are reduced if the relative
number of incongruent trials is increased
(Lowe andMitterer, 1982). This proportion
congruent (PC) effect is most commonly
interpreted as evidence for the conflict
adaptation account (e.g., Botvinick et al.,
2001). This account argues that detection
of conflict results in a decrease of attention
to the source of conflict (e.g., the word in a
Stroop task). Because conflict is more fre-
quent in a mostly incongruent condition,
attention to the word is particularly low.
The word therefore has little impact on
performance, and the congruency effect is
resultantly small.
Though seemingly intuitive, the con-
flict adaptation account does face some
important challenges. For instance, con-
sider the item-specific PC effect (Jacoby
et al., 2003). In this variant of the PC task,
some words are mostly congruent and oth-
ers aremostly incongruent. These two item
types are intermixed into one procedure,
but there is nevertheless a smaller effect
for mostly incongruent items. This might
be described in terms of item-specific
adaptations of attention (e.g., Blais et al.,
2007), though this requires the unintuitive
assumption that attention to the word is
determined by the identity of the word
(which must, of course, first be identi-
fied; but see Verguts and Notebaert, 2008).
Alternatively, the contingency account pro-
poses that the entire item-specific PC
effect is explained by the learning of con-
tingent relationships between distracting
words and responses (Schmidt and Besner,
2008; Schmidt, 2013b; for a review, see
Schmidt, 2013a). For mostly congruent
stimuli, each word is presented most often
with the congruent color. This means that,
for instance, the word “blue” is predic-
tive of a blue response. Congruent trials
thus benefit from this prediction, and the
congruency effect increases. For mostly
incongruent stimuli, the reverse is true:
each word is presented most often with a
specific incongruent response. Thus, “red”
might be predictive of a yellow response.
Incongruent trials thus benefit, and the
congruency effect decreases. Some evi-
dence argues compellingly in favor of
the contingency account (Schmidt and
Besner, 2008; Atalay and Misirlisoy, 2012;
Grandjean et al., 2013; Schmidt, 2013b).
For instance, Schmidt (2013b) presents
a dissociation procedure in which con-
tingency learning and conflict adaptation
could be separately assessed. Specifically,
it was possible to compare sets of incon-
gruent trials that were: (a) equivalent in
PC (mostly incongruent) but that varied in
contingency (high vs. low), or (b) equiva-
lent in contingency (low contingency) but
that varied in PC (mostly congruent vs.
mostly incongruent). Thus, the former set
allows an assessment of contingency learn-
ing in the absence of conflict adaptation,
and the latter set allows an assessment of
conflict adaptation in the absence of a con-
tingency bias. These comparisons revealed
a very strong contingency effect, with
no evidence for conflict adaptation. The
(item-specific) PC effect thus might have
nothing to do with conflict adaptation at
all. Some neuropsychological data even
argues that the area claimed to be involved
in (item-specific) conflict adaptation (viz.,
the anterior cingulate cortex; see Blais and
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Bunge, 2010) might instead be involved
in contingency learning (Grandjean et al.,
2013).
On the other hand, many argue that
conflict adaptation can be observed inde-
pendently of contingency biases (e.g.,
Crump and Milliken, 2009; Blais and
Bunge, 2010; Bugg et al., 2011; Abrahamse
et al., 2013; Bugg and Hutchison,
2013). One specific claim is that, while
contingency learning might dominate
performance in some scenarios, con-
flict adaptation might still be observable
in others (Bugg et al., 2011; Bugg and
Hutchison, 2013). For instance, Bugg and
colleagues argue that if the target is easier
to process than the distracter, use of con-
tingencies associated with the distracter
might be impaired. The target then might
serve as a cue to PC. Of interest for the
current discussion, Bugg and Hutchison
further argue that in designs where mostly
congruent and mostly incongruent stim-
uli are equally informative, contingencies
dominate processing. However, when
mostly incongruent stimuli are uninfor-
mative this is no longer the case. For
instance, if a color word is presented
equally often in four colors, then the
word is mostly incongruent (i.e., 75%
incongruent), but it is not predictive of
what to respond (i.e., each of the four
responses are equiprobable). According to
those authors, weakening the predictive-
ness of the distracters in this way impairs
the contingency mechanism and allows
conflict adaptation to play a role. In other
words, they argue that conflict adaptation
can occur, but only when contingency
learning does not “steal the show.” In
support of this, they found that when
mostly incongruent stimuli were as pre-
dictive as mostly congruent stimuli, the
data fit the predictions of the contin-
gency account. However, when mostly
incongruent stimuli were unpredictive
and mostly congruent stimuli were (still)
predictive, they found a different pattern
of results. Specifically, they found mostly
interference-driven effects in this scenario,
with large impairments of incongruent
items in the mostly congruent relative to
mostly incongruent condition. In con-
trast, little differences were observed for
congruent items. This is not what the
contingency account should predict, espe-
cially since the only contingencies present
in the task were for congruent items. Such a
pattern is seemingly more consistent with
the conflict adaptation account.
Results such as those in Bugg
and Hutchison (2013) are thus quite
interesting, because they suggest that
conflict adaptation might indeed exist
independent of contingency learning
biases. However, the key critique of the
current article is that the modified task
configuration used in such experiments
adds an additional complexity to the task.
The contingency account was originally
proposed to explain the simple scenario
in which some words were mostly cor-
related with the congruent response,
whereas other words were mostly cor-
related with an incongruent response
(Schmidt and Besner, 2008). The word
is equally informative in both scenarios.
Generally speaking, when these same cri-
teria were met in subsequent experiments,
evidence for an exclusively contingency-
driven account of the data remained
compelling (e.g., Bugg and Hutchison,
2013; Schmidt, 2013b). Comparing a con-
tingent mostly congruent condition to a
non-contingent mostly incongruent con-
dition might produce results that seem
harder to interpret from a contingency
learning perspective, but this might also
be like comparing apples to oranges. It is
known that a contingency-laden dimen-
sion must be attended in order to learn the
correlation (e.g., Chun and Jiang, 2001).
More importantly, it is also know that
when a contingency is detected for a given
distracting stimulus, attention is attracted
to this stimulus (e.g., Chun and Jiang,
1998; Cosman and Vecera, 2014). For
instance, Cosman and Vecera presented
participants with a red or green cue on
the left or right of the screen, followed
by two letters in the two possible cue loca-
tions. One of the letters was a target, which
participants identified, and the other not.
Each letter was presented in either red or
green. Neither the cue location nor the
cue color predicted the color, location,
or identity of the target. However, targets
were presented most often in one color
(e.g., red). As typically observed, responses
were faster when the cue location matched
the target location, indicating attentional
capture of the cue. Most importantly, this
attentional capture effect was larger when
the cue was the color that the targets were
typically presented in. This indicates that
a contingent stimulus (e.g., red color)
captures attention.
The notion that contingent stimuli
attract attention only stands to reason:
predictive stimuli in our environment are
attended because they can help guide our
behavior (see also, Hutcheon and Spieler,
2014). Thus, the suggestion here is that
a correlated mostly congruent distracting
word will attract more attention than an
uncorrelated mostly incongruent one in
experiments such as those of Bugg and
Hutchison (2013). This is because the
distracter is informative of the response
in the former condition (i.e., contin-
gent), but not in the latter condition.
Thus, changes in attention across these
two conditions will indeed lead to larger
congruency effects in the mostly congru-
ent condition. Specifically, attending to a
mostly congruent word will have a large
impairment on incongruent trials, due to
an increase in interference. This explains
the large impairments of incongruent tri-
als in the (predictive) mostly congruent
condition relative to the (non-predictive)
mostly incongruent condition observed by
Bugg and Hutchison (2013). Indeed, the
expected results are the same as those for
the conflict adaptation account, because
both accounts predict that the congruency
effect is modulated by attentional differ-
ences. Of course, the difference is what
drives those attentional differences: con-
tingencies or conflict.
Note again that differences in infor-
mativeness between mostly congruent and
mostly incongruent stimuli are not always
present in PC experiments (e.g., Jacoby
et al., 2003). If words in the mostly incon-
gruent condition are just as predictive of
what response to make as in the mostly
congruent condition, then informative-
ness is equated. Thus, attention would
not vary across conditions. When Bugg
and Hutchison (2013) removed this equal-
ity in informativeness between mostly
congruent and mostly incongruent stim-
uli, however, the prior work on contin-
gency learning discussed above suggests
that attentional differences should become
relevant. Note that this proposed atten-
tional variation has nothing to do with
an adaptation to conflict, however. The
proposal is not that attention is pulled
away from conflicting stimuli. Instead, the
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suggestion is that attention is attracted
to stimuli that provide predictive infor-
mation. Indeed, in the particular case of
a PC task, a contingent word is also a
viable cue for responding. Thus, attention
may indeed be relevant, but conflict might
not be.
Future work on this topic will need to
focus not only on contingency confounds,
simply speaking, but also on the overall
informativeness of each stimulus. These
considerations alone probably do not
explain the entire range of data in the field
(for a review of several others, see Schmidt,
2013a), but task regularities that allow the
possibility for learning conflict-unrelated
information do muddy the interpreta-
tion of any observed effects. The present
analysis does not, however, only serve to
question the interpretability of previously-
published results. It is also hoped that
this article might inspire future research
on the potential role of attentional cap-
ture of contingent information in various
conflict tasks. For instance, future research
might attempt to assess stimulus infor-
mativeness biases independent of conflict.
Informative stimuli might thus be shown
to produce larger congruency effects, even
if dissociated from PC. Complimentarily,
one might attempt to test the notion of
Bugg and Hutchison (2013) that conflict
adaptation is observable when contingen-
cies are absent or weak by constructing
a situation in which mostly congruent
andmostly incongruent stimuli are equally
(un)informative. Disentangling these two
accounts will probably be challenging, but
would be fruitful if possible.
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